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At the time of writing this article, the European Union (EU) is fifty years old. 
With its 27 member states today, and with Croatia and other countries to join in 
the future as well, the EU is no doubt one of the most successful economic 
integration blocs in the world. Nevertheless economic integration or regionalism 
always will remain a second best solution compared to multilateral trade 
liberalization. In the Treaty of Rome (1957), the customs union was chosen as the 
basic option for economic integration, and not the free trade area which was 
adopted for instance by  NAFTA and EFTA. The choice for the customs union 
relies more on political than on economic arguments. Since the achievement of 
the customs union in 1968, the EU became over the years a common market, an 
economic union, and a monetary union limited to the countries that adopted the 
euro in the meantime. The EU as a market economy requires free interaction 
between producers and consumers. There is however in customs union theory 
some built in bias in favor of the producers. This tendency is confirmed by many 
producer oriented policies in the EU, and these are not sufficiently compensated 
by the soft policy on consumer protection. The performance of the EU is not 
optimal in fields such as efficiency, effectiveness, representation, and 
accountability. The Constitution offers a regulatory framework for a better 
performance of the EU. Unfortunately, the Constitution has been rejected in 2005 
by the negative referendum in France and the Netherlands. On 23 June 2007, the 
heads of state of the EU decided to go ahead with a scaled down version of the 
Constitution. Implementation of this Reform Treaty is expected in 2009.  
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The first step towards European economic integration was initiated by 
two small countries in Europe – Belgium and Luxembourg – through the signing 
of the Belgian Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) in 1921. During the second 
world war (1944) the Benelux Treaty was signed in London between Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The real start-up of this small customs union 
followed soon after the war in 1948. 
The successful Benelux, which still exists today, acted as an incentive to 
incorporate more European countries into economic integration. In 1951, the 
Treaty of Paris was signed, creating the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), involving six members: the Benelux countries together with Germany, 
Italy and France. Later these countries signed the Treaty of Rome (1957), 
constituting the agreement to create the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), better known as 
EURATOM. 
The success of the EEC, the ECSC and EURATOM – together called the 
European Community(ies) or EC since 1967 – attracted in 1973 the first new 
member states : the UK, Ireland and Denmark. This new group of 9 member 
states was joined by Greece in 1981, by Spain and Portugal in 1986, and in 1995 
by Austria, Sweden and Finland. The most challenging enlargement that ever 
happened in European history took place on 1 May 2004. Membership increased 
from 15 to 25 countries. Except for Malta and Cyprus, all new member states are 
located in Central and Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia). 
Romania and Bulgaria joined on 1 January 2007. Depending on the positive 
outcome of the negotiations, Croatia and Turkey (Tezcan, 2004, p. 569-575) 
could become member as well. An important problem for Turkish membership is 
the official recognition of the Greek part of Cyprus. Similarly, when peace and 
political stability are ever established in the Balkans, all these states eventually 
are expected to become part of European integration in the future. Whether the 
EFTA countries – Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein – could join the 
EU will depend on the appropriate political decisions of these countries. It cannot 
be excluded that in the long run the EU would cover the entire geographical area 
of Europe. 
 
1 This article is an adapted and updated version of Roosens, P. (2001), Reflexions on 50 Years of 
European Economic Integration, written for the Centro de Investigaciones en Educación y Negocios 
Internacionales (CIENI), in The Anáhuac Journal, Universidad Anáhuac del Sur, Mexico City, vol. 3, 
nr. 2, p. 148 – 159. 
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Over the years, the Treaty of Rome has been amended to adapt to the 
changing economic, political and world environment. The first change occurred 
in 1986 with the Single European Act (or Unity Act), followed in 1992 by the 
Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the Treaty of Nice in 
2000, and finally the European Constitution in 2004 (Official Journal, 16 
December 2004). The European Constitution failed to get unanimous approval by 
the member states, as it got rejected in 2005 by a French and Dutch referendum. 
Consequently the Treaty of Nice is still applicable at the time of writing this 
paper. On 23 June 2007, the European Council decided to substitute the 
Constitution by a new Reform Treaty. Expected time of implementation is 2009. 
Given the historical diversity of the European countries, half a century of 
integration is already an achievement in itself. The continuing enlargement 
process demonstrates without doubt the success story of the European Union. 
However, questions could be asked about some fundamental choices 
made during the 50 years of European economic integration. What are the 
consequences of regional free trade (regionalism) in Europe versus worldwide 
free trade (multilateralism) and what was the reason in 1957 to choose for a 
customs union and not for a free trade area? Can we really say that the decision-
making process in Europe is serving the best interests of everybody? What will be 
the evolution in the future? These questions will be the basis for some critical 
reflections in the next lines of this article. 
 
 
1. REGIONALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISM 
A lot of academic attention has already been given to the debate about 
‘regionalism’ versus multilateralism’ (Bhagwati, 1999). It cannot be denied that 
the multilateral activities of the GATT (WTO since 1994) have reduced 
worldwide protectionism since World War II, thereby substantially increasing 
global consumer surplus and welfare. The global negotiations during the Kennedy 
Round, Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round contributed to more freedom in 
international trade. However, the ideal of complete multilateral trade 
liberalization is still very far away, and the problems of the Doha Round do not 
offer a positive perspective for the future. 
Many countries over the years did not have the patience to wait for the 
slow process of multilateral trade liberalization, but consequently decided to start 
up mutual preferential trade agreements (PTAs), known as economic integration 
or regionalism. Compared to multilateralism, PTAs only offer a second best 
solution, as free trade is created for members but protectionism is maintained 
against non members (Bhagwati, 1998 , p. 289). This makes PTAs even legally 
inconsistent with the principle of non discrimination of the GATT/WTO. Legal 
existence of PTAs is only possible by relying on a specific exception which is 
granted by article XXIV of the GATT agreement. Over the years regional trade 
blocs have become very popular as a substitute for multilateral trade 
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liberalization. Regionalism is considered to offer a quicker solution, to be more 
efficient and to produce a more certain outcome (Bhagwati, 1999, p. 21-25). 
Regionalism can be considered as the melting together of separate 
national economies into one entity. It is a process of eliminating economic 
discrimination between the partners of the economic integration bloc. The lowest 
form of economic integration is certainly the free trade area (FTA). The partners 
aim at the complete abolition of trade barriers, but the previously existing import 
taxes of the partner countries are maintained against outsiders. Typical examples 
are the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA). EFTA was started in 1960 by the Convention of Stockholm, 
and is still the second largest economic integration bloc in Europe. The members 
are Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. A specific administrative 
problem for all free trade areas are the certificates of origin, which are designed 
to prevent the import of goods from third countries into the zone via the zone-
country with the lowest external tariff. A customs union is stricter since it 
provides a common external tariff and a common trade policy. If additionally free 
movement of factors of production becomes possible, the term common market is 
applicable. The economic and monetary union includes, furthermore, a common 
economic and monetary policy. The principle of unification has been 
complemented in the EU with the subsidiarity principle, which delegates lower-
level decision-making into the hands of the national governments. Finally 
political union will be achieved when the political decision-making of the 
members is delegated to one supranational authority. For some policies, the 
European Union is now at the stage of economic union, and at a monetary union 
stage only for the thirteen2 countries that adopted the Euro. 
 
 
2. THE EEC BASED ON A CUSTOMS UNION 
The EEC was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, explicitly based on 
the establishment of a customs union, and with the intention to reach higher 
degrees of integration afterwards. The option to build the EEC as a customs 
union, and not as a free trade area, was however not based on a solid economic 
justification. From the text of the treaty, it can be concluded that implicit positive 
economic results were hoped for, but there was no evidence that these results 
would be better or worse than in the case of a free trade area. Such a decision 
under rather uncertain circumstances can definitely be considered as an economic 
experiment. 
It was only in later stages that the empirical studies of Balassa, Truman 
and others proved that the beneficial effects of trade creation were substantially 
 
2 In alphabetical order: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain. Cyprus and Malta will join the euro zone on 
1 January 2008. 
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larger than the negative effects of trade diversion (El-Agraa, 2004, p. 134). But 
once again, it remains an open question whether these effects would have been 
exactly the same or less in the case of a free trade area (Helmer, 2007, p. 81 – 
85). The choice of a customs union instead of a free trade area can only be 
explained from a historical-political background. It was common belief during the 
post-war period in Europe that new conflicts could be best prevented by some 
sort of European political unity. But there was a general awareness as well that 
direct political unification was impossible –witness the failure of the European 
Defense Community. At the same time, indirect political unification through the 
merging of different European economies by means of partial sector integration 
(like the European Coal and Steel Community) seemed too limited to yield 
significant results. Hence it was considered politically necessary to realize a 
comprehensive economic integration. 
Compared to a free trade area, countries are more tied together in a 
customs union via the common external tariff and the common external trade 
policy. This could be a sensible explanation why a customs union is preferred 
over a free trade area in the European context. 
New members joined the customs union over the years. Although it is 
demonstrated in economic integration theories that a customs union can only 
function properly when the partners have a comparable level of economic 
development, nevertheless  countries lagging behind economically were accepted 
into the customs union, like Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the Central and Eastern 
European countries that became member on 1 May 2004. Here again, the 
economic justification is overshadowed by the political motive. 
Indeed, Europe has always been interested in having full free access to 
the Mediterranean Sea, and in getting stronger borders in the Eastern part of 
Europe and in the direction of Russia. The economic price for such a political 
strategy is constituted by the huge money transfers that are given to these 
countries from the structural funds and the cohesion fund (de Perthuis, 2004, p. 
10-17). In this way, Europe tries to stimulate the economic performance of these 
countries and to bring these closer to the European average. After reaching 
sufficient convergence the customs union could function in a more efficient way. 
Artificial constructions sometimes try to ‘justify’ the distortion between 
economic reality and political ambitions. A good example is the old Tindemans 
Report of 1975, willing to accept a two speed Europe. In recent years this idea 
came to life again in the growing demands for an avant-garde or inner core of 
EU countries that can go ahead with deeper integration if they wish. A similar 
construction is the European Monetary Union with only thirteen countries today. 
The common monetary policy of the European Central Bank is not applicable to 
the UK, Denmark, and Sweden, and it remains to be seen whether ever all recent 
new member states will be able to introduce the euro. The European Constitution 
accepts officially a two speed Europe between the euro-zone and the non-euro 
members (article III-194). 
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3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CUSTOMS 
UNION 
After the Treaty of Rome, the customs union was quickly achieved, at 
least formally speaking. By mid-1968, the last internal tariffs between the six 
original member states were eliminated. Proponents of the EEC proudly pointed 
out that this was accomplished ahead of the planned schedule. However, at that 
time it was not realized that the member states were substituting import tariffs 
with new forms of protectionism having similar effects, the so-called non-tariff 
barriers (NTB s). So, eventually, the customs union had not been fully realized, 
and since the Summit of Luxembourg (1985) the new target date became the 
close of 1992. 
The most obvious types of NTB s disappeared after 1992, and were 
turned into mandatory food-labeling practices, minimum technical standards, CE-
marks, marketing directives and the like. After all, it is easier to create new NTB 
s than to eliminate existing ones. And last but not least, there is still the exception 
of the old article 36 in the treaties, changed into article 30 since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, and mentioned under article III-154 in the Constitution. This 
exception makes it possible to restrict imports from partner countries based on 
arguments such as protection of consumer health, public morality, national safety, 
and so on. This exception has been used on several occasions, for instance to keep 
out British beef during the BSE crisis, to ban imports of Belgian food when it was 
suspected of dioxine contamination, etc.  
Although NTB s still exist, and the use of article 36 (30) is still 
applicable, they do not cause a significant distortion anymore in the internal free 
trade system of the EU since the Cassis de Dijon case (1979). The conclusion of 
this case was that products legally produced and distributed in an EU country 
automatically have to be accepted in the partner countries. It can therefore be 
stated that – besides some minor imperfections (Kelemen and Menon, 2007, p. 80 
– 85) – the customs union is fully accomplished in the European Union. 
Another question, however, is whether the customs union delivers better 
economic results than a free trade area. The scope of this paper is not to run a 
full analysis into this matter. But it can be said that the macroeconomic results of 
the EU countries do not outperform those of EFTA (EFTA Facts and Figures, 
2004), which after all is a less sophisticated form of economic integration. So 
there is no solid macroeconomic justification to prefer a customs union over a 
free trade area. 
Perhaps a better explanation can be found in the common external tariff 
of a customs union. It was proved a long time ago that the common external tariff 
can be used by the customs union as an international instrument of negotiation 
(Johnson, 1965, p.256-283). Sometimes the EU behaves in a liberal way, other 
times as a protectionist. 
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The liberal attitude appears in the considerable lowering of external 
tariffs in the framework of the GATT/WTO tariff negotiations. Moreover, the EU 
provides in its external tariff many exceptions according to the clauses in free 
trade and preferential agreements. Good examples are the full free trade 
agreements with South Africa and Mexico. 
However, the EU does not hesitate to use its common trade policy for 
the defense of its European interests, if such a defense seems necessary. This 
defensive strategy takes place mainly in the interest of the producer and to a 
lesser extent in the interest of the consumer. It is after all much easier for 
producers than for consumers to get organized in powerful lobbies, hence the 
former can safeguard their interests more efficiently by applying pressure on 
politicians and bureaucrats (Lepage, 1982, p. 35). 
 
 
4. EUROPE IN FAVOR OF THE PRODUCERS 
Is there in the EU any further bias in favor of the producers? Without 
doubt it can be said that there was no explicit consumer policy in the articles of 
the Treaty of Rome. An explicit consumer policy was intentionally introduced 
through the Single European Act (article 100), and in a more detailed way in 
1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht (article 129a). This is by any measure very late, 
and the Constitution does not deliver any drastic changes for the future (article 
III-235). 
The efforts that are currently being made are anyway highly ineffective. 
Most actions have been taken in the form of directives related to food safety and 
some marketing practices, like food labeling, consumer credit, dangerous 
imitation, doorstep selling, and such like. Directives –in contrast to regulations – 
are not considered to be European law. They cannot be implemented as long as 
they are not incorporated into national law. Consequently, the way they protect 
the consumer can look different from one member state to another. This makes 
cross border protection of the consumer in the EU very difficult. 
More confusing even are the numerous consumer organizations that are 
active at the EU and national levels. Although the EU started up the so called 
European Consumer Consultative Group in October 2003, this group only has 
advisory power. Last but not least, consumer protection is hidden in many other 
policies of the EU, like competition policy, environmental policy, etc. In effect, 
however, this does not contribute to transparency in consumer protection. 
Moreover, customs union theory provides in many cases a negative 
built-in bias against the consumer. This can be illustrated by referring to graph 1.  
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Source: Roosens (2001), p. 152 
Graph 1. 
Dd represents the domestic demand curve and Sd the domestic supply 
curve. When a customs union is realized the supply curve shifts to the right and 
becomes Scu. Sw represents the worldwide supply, provided the home country 
and the customs union are considered to be price takers. Let us first analyze the 
case of trade diversion. In the absence of a customs union, we assume initially 
that the home country imposes a non-preferential tariff RQ. This results in a 
consumption level ON, of which OL is supplied by the domestic producers and 
LN is imported from the world market. The customs revenue for the government 
will be BCWV.   
Starting from this situation, assume the home country gets engaged in a 
customs union. This does not improve the situation. The consumption level 
remains ON. The imports from the partner countries in the customs union are 
represented by LN, which means that the import LN of the world market is 
substituted by import from the partner nations of the customs union. This reflects 
the economically less efficient allocation of factors of production that will occur 
under trade diversion, since the lower cost supplier from outside the customs 
union is substituted by the higher cost supplier from within the customs union. 
The home country will have to give up the customs revenue BCWV, which can 
be considered as the protection cost in favor of the higher cost producer in the 
customs union. 
While the consumer at first sight is not negatively influenced by this 
situation of trade diversion, it is not uncommon that governments will try to 
compensate the lost revenue BCWV by higher income taxes, higher VAT and 
excise taxes. There is only one conclusion here: trade diversion has to be avoided 
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and customs unions with a lot of trade diversion should never be started up in the 
first place. 
In the case of trade creation, assume as a starting point a non-preferential 
tariff RP. An amount of OM will be consumed and will be supplied by the 
domestic producers. In the process of establishing a customs union, consumption 
will increase from OM to ON, domestic production will decrease from OM to 
OL, and imports in the order of LN will occur between partners within the 
customs union. This is an illustration of trade creation. The consumer has an 
advantage in this situation: consumption increases and the price declines. Overall 
production in the customs union as well increases from OM to ON. Although the 
production in the home country itself decreases to OL, a reallocation of the 
factors of production should be expected in favor of domestic production in other 
sectors where more comparative advantages are available vis-à-vis the partner 
countries in the customs union. However, if such reciprocal comparative 
advantages are not available, then the customs union would be a meaningless 
construction. Reference can be made here to one of the important conditions for a 
successful customs union: before starting up the integration; the economies of the 
interested partners should be actually very competitive and potentially 
complementary (Swann, 2000, p.123). 
Instead of a customs union with trade creation, we could consider a non-
preferential lowering of tariffs from RP to RQ. The consumer is now as well off 
as under the customs union with trade creation, because consumption increases 
from OM to ON. The domestic producer supplies an amount OL, which is the 
same as in the customs union. The import LN, however, is not coming from the 
partner countries but from the cheaper world market. At the same time, the home 
country can enjoy again a customs revenue BCWV, which could serve as the 
basis for lower income taxes, VAT or excise taxes. In other words, a customs 
union with trade creation does not yield better economic results compared to a 
policy of non-preferential lowering of tariff levels. This conclusion was already 
reached in the early days of 1965 by Cooper and Massell, but later on challenged 
in research such as by Wonnacott and Wonnacott,  Jones, El-Agraa (El-Agraa, 
2004, p. 101-113). There is a strong theoretical case that many customs unions are 
not likely to eliminate all trade with outside countries. This point is very well 
demonstrated in the EU by the forty percent of all EU-trade which is related to 
non member states. Undeniably the more efficient producer in the global context 
will not always have access to the EU market, and this reduces overall welfare in 
the EU. A good example is the protective common agricultural policy of the EU, 
making the imports from more efficient food producers in the world very 
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5. A EUROPE OF POLITICIANS AND EUROCRATS3
An international organization, like the EU, can be likened to a club of 
countries. The purpose of such a club is to achieve by common action certain 
goals which are impossible or hard to reach by the individual countries. The 
necessary condition for members to join the club is the expectation about the 
achievement of a net positive result from membership. If this is not the case, entry 
into the club will not happen as is proven by the fact that Switzerland and 
Norway refrained from joining the EU, or by the refusal of the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden to adopt the euro. Membership can also be cancelled, as in the case of 
Greenland which decided to leave the EEC in 1984 (based on a referendum in 
1982). The voluntary withdrawal from the European Union is explicitly provided 
for in article I-60 of the Constitution. 
 
5.1. Efficiency 
An efficient economic integration arrangement should generate higher 
total welfare than any other arrangement (Berglöf, p. 34). The bottom line is that 
at least one member of the economic integration gets better off and nobody else 
gets worse off. But as already discussed in paragraph three, it is not clear whether 
the EU as a customs union constitutes a more efficient solution than a free trade 
area. Some pessimist estimates claim that free trade in the EU contributes 1.8 % 
to GDP, but the complexity of the EU and its overregulation would cost around 
5.5 % of GDP (Helmer, 2007, p. 83).  
But the goals of the European Union are not exclusively economic 
(Constitution, article I-3). Consequently the overall net benefits to be expected 
can hardly be expressed in monetary terms only. Therefore, entry into the 
community is not only based on the net economic benefits of economic 
integration, but also on the other, non-economic dimensions connected with 
membership. Thus the considerable economic uncertainty about the economic 
usefulness of the entry of ten new member states on 1 May 2004 has to be 
considered as subordinated to the political, geographic and strategic aspects. It 
can be expected that these non-economic arguments will continue to be used in 
the future in favor of countries applying for membership4. 
The focus on efficiency in the EU is estimated to be low for the Council, 




3 Eurocrats: bureaucrats working in the institutions of the European Union. 
4 The strict political, economic and legislative criteria for membership are published in the 
Copenhagen criteria. 
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5.2. Effectiveness 
In order to achieve the goals of the club, provisions have to be made for 
the vital organizational structure and the institutions, like the Council of 
Ministers, the Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, the 
Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and other. The 
question is now whether this group of European politicians and eurocrats is 
capable of defining strategic goals and of implementing economic integration in 
an effective way.  In other words: are they able to state the practical goals needed 
for economic integration and to adopt the necessary decisions and actions? Some 
opponents have serious doubts about the effectiveness of decision-making in the 
EU institutions (Cihelkova, 2007, p. 149 – 150) and others consider the EU as 
guided by faulty mechanisms and surrounded by a cacophony of conflicting 
voices (Gillingham, 2003, p. 313). 
The organizational structure of the EU could be compared to a 
production function. The efforts of the European politicians and administrators 
can be considered to be the inputs, and the integration results as the output. On 
the side of the output, it can be often observed that the EU is struggling with an 
inadequate perception of the nature, size and quality of the outputs to be 
produced. Examples of inadequate output results are numerous. A good case is 
the EU common agricultural policy (CAP): too expensive and harming 
consumers with food prices higher than world prices. The export subsidies and 
the variable import levies are a straightforward violation of the GATT/WTO 
rules. The reform of the CAP during the last years is mainly the result of the 
Uruguay Round.  
Another example is the social policy, which even today remains too 
vague. The anti-global movement in Europe and several labor unions more than 
once complained that the social Europe is not yet satisfactorily implemented. At 
the same time, it is obviously much better for the producers that socially 
acceptable working conditions can be delayed as long as possible. 
The energy and the environmental policy of the EU rely on one of the 
highest indirect taxes in the world, causing the EU final fuel prices to be twice as 
high as the world average. Consequently, the EU transportation system is more 
expensive than elsewhere in the world, causing a negative impact on the 
competitiveness of EU business life. On the other hand the EU is very ambitious 
about the development of a trans-European network based on the HST (high 
speed train). The fares, however, are at the level of an airline ticket and suit more 
the needs of business travelers. At the same time, the huge investment cost drains 
away funds from investment projects in the domestic railways, which are used 
mostly by everyday commuters and consumers.  
The effectiveness in the field of many other policies is disappointing as 
well, such as the consumer policy, the protection of the environment, the asylum 
policy. The EU is not able to meet the goals of the Lisbon strategy (Bailly, 2004, 
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p. 425-429), and is lagging behind the US in economic growth, employment and 
level of competitiveness. 
Generally speaking, as far as political and bureaucratic inputs are 
concerned, the widespread conviction has existed for a long time already that the 
political and bureaucratic apparatus has an inherent tendency to expand at the 
expense of society. As the EU keeps growing – both horizontally in terms of 
members and vertically in activities – more complex structures arise, causing 
inevitably a more sluggish decision-making process and a less effective 
implementation. The goal of a common Europe will not come closer with a 
proliferation of the political and bureaucratic machinery. More intervention and 
regulation could be an obstacle to create a better integrated Europe. A good 
balancing approach consists in the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Subsidiarity delegates some lower level decision making to the member states 
and goes together with the tendency towards more political autonomy for some 
larger regions in the EU. It could make however the EU less transparent. The best 
remedy against ineffectiveness in the EU could be the strict implementation of the 
principle of proportionality, which requires EU legislation to be no more than the 
strict minimum to achieve a particular objective. 
Effectiveness in the EU becomes most visible at the level of the 
European political institutions. The score for effectiveness is indeed low for the 
Council and medium for the Parliament (Berglöf, p. 43). It is not surprising that 
the Commission gets a high score, as its staff is not political but expert oriented. 
 
5.3. Representation    
Are the interests of everybody in the EU taken care of in the same way? 
It is striking that in the majority of EU policies, the producer is taken into account 
in a much better way than the consumer. ‘Public choice’ theories offer 
explanations as to why politicians and administrators comply with the needs of 
producers rather than those of the consumer (Lepage, 1982, p. 81 - 106). 
European politicians and eurocrats feel they can protect their own existence by 
being cooperative vis-à-vis producer lobbies, while spreading out the burden and 
costs among consumers without meeting any significant resistance. Business 
lobbying is consequently an accepted fact of life in the EU (Gillingham, 2003, p. 
264). Lobbying systems in the EU are complex (Broscheid & Coen, 2006, 19 p.) 
and lack transparency (Commission, 2006, 17 p.). Because of the high cost of 
information, the consumers cannot develop an efficient anti-lobby, and are hardly 
in a position to have a significant influence through the democratic voting process 
on the output provided by politicians and civil servants. As the Commission is 
involved in the daily implementation of the EU policies, they are more vulnerable 
to every day lobbying than the Council and the Parliament. Consequently the 
score for representation is low for the Commission, and medium for the Council 
and the Parliament (Berglöf, 2003, p. 43). 
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The problem of correct representation was a hot issue during the 
negotiations for the Nice treaty. The French government was able to get as much 
voting power (29 votes) in the Council as Germany, while Germany is 
economically more dominant and counts 20 million more people. A similar 
calculation was not applied to Belgium, which got 12 votes compared to 13 for 
the Netherlands. Here Belgium was sanctioned because the Netherlands has 5 
million more people.   
The 27 actual member states have an accumulated total of 345 votes in 
the Council of Ministers. A decision which requires qualified majority will be 
accepted if 255 votes – this is 74 % - are in favor. Furthermore, a majority of 
member states should back the proposal and they must represent at least 62 % of 
the EU population. The Constitution replaces this requirement by a simplified 
system of double majority (Part I article 25). At least 55% of the members of the 
Council should be in favor, representing 65% or more of the EU population.   
 
5.4. Accountability 
Typical of any kind of government service, and also of European policy, 
is the lack of competition. Inadequate public management is not sanctioned by the 
corrective market mechanism (Lepage, 1982, p. 81 – 106). Lacking any market 
mechanism, accountability in the EU can only be based on the judgment of 
Europe’s citizens. Such an accountability process is very indirect and hard to 
implement especially in the case of the Commission. Just once in the history of  
the EU has there been a major sanction: based on fraud perpetrated by some 
commissioners, the European Parliament opened an investigation, forcing as a 
result the entire Commission to resign in 1999 (Baldwin, 2004, p. 52-53). As the 
Parliament has to give prior approval before a new Commission can start its 
activities, they gave the new President Barroso and his group of commissioners 
initially a hard time. Unfortunately the approval or rejection by the Parliament 
can be politically biased. Sometimes the Commission can be morally sanctioned, 
especially when a decision is considered to be wrong and is publicly reversed by 
the Court of Justice. As a conclusion, accountability is generally low for the 
Commission (Berglöf, 2003, p. 43). Accountabily for the Parliament and Council 
is medium because they are subject to a democratic voting process. The members 
of the Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the member states, and the 
same applies for the ministers of the Council. The general public however gets 
less information in the media about the activities in the Parliament and the 
Council compared to domestic political life. Less transparency undeniably results 
in lower levels of accountability. This lack of information backfired on the EU in 
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6. THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION: A STEP IN THE  
GOOD DIRECTION 
Any improvement in European accountability, representation, 
effectiveness and efficiency will have to rely on a system of more simplicity and 
transparency in the EU. This is one of the main reasons why the European 
Constitution was approved by the European Council on 18 June 2004, and signed 
in Rome on 29 October 2004 (Official Journal, 16 Dec. 2004). The final 
implementation however requires the unanimous approval of all member states, 
which unfortunately did not happen because of the negative referenda of 2005 in 
France and the Netherlands.  
Between 2005 and 23 June 2007, EU politicians did a lot of 
brainstorming about the future fate of the Constitution. The solution could be an 
amended text, or to cancel the requirement of unanimous approval of all member 
states, or to accept a double geared EU with a cluster of countries following the 
Constitution and another cluster still relying on the Treaty of Nice. 
The European Constitution introduces a lot of simplifications aiming at 
improving the complex organizational and bureaucratic structure of the European 
Union. 
Some of the important changes are the following:  
- The single legal personality allows the EU to sign international treaties. 
A minister of foreign affairs is responsible for the common foreign and 
defense policy of the EU. 
- A restriction is introduced on the size of the European Parliament and 
the Commission. 
- Most decisions are based on majority voting. 
- The complex system of the six-month rotating presidency of the 
European Council is replaced by a president who is elected by the 
Council for a maximum period of five years. 
- Members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) can enforce their 
own euro-zone rules. This allows Europe to run a double geared 
economic development: the euro-countries and the non-euro group. 
- The possibility is provided for an EU wide referendum if a minimum of 
one million EU citizens ask for it. 
- There is an exit clause giving clear guidelines for countries that want to 
give up their membership. 
- National veto power is limited to sensitive issues such as foreign policy, 
taxation, national quotas for immigration. 
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All these actions undoubtedly constitute a step in the good direction, but 
they became a missed opportunity (Barroso, 2006, 10 p.) since the refusal by 
France and the Netherlands. 
Under the presidency of Germany, the 27 heads of state of the European 
Union had a meeting of the European Council in Brussels on 21 and 22 June 
2007. The German chancellor Merkel tried to convince all member states about 
the necessity to agree at least about a scaled down version of the constitution. 
Finally an agreement was reached on 23 June about a new Reform Treaty as a 
substitute for the Constitution. The key dates are end of 2007 for the full official 
text and 2009 for the implementation. Many important parts of the Constitution 
are saved (Presidency Conclusions, 2007, 31 p.). A High Representative – the 
name ‘minister’ was abandoned- for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be 
appointed, making it easier for the EU to speak with one voice. A permanent 
President will replace the 6 months rotating presidency of the EU. National 
parliaments will be given an increased role, and the number of Commissioners 
will be reduced. The actual system of qualified majority voting in the Council of 




The fact that European economic integration – called the European 
Union or EU in its current form – still exists after nearly 50 years of existence, is 
already a success in itself. The attractiveness of the EU is furthermore highlighted 
by the increasing number of new members: from 6 countries in the beginning to 
27 members at the moment. Although worldwide multilateral free trade is 
theoretically superior to economic integration, its implementation is difficult and 
too slow. The process of trade liberalization is faster in the case of economic 
integration, but it tends to favor the producers more intensively than the 
consumers. 
The choice of a customs union (CU) as the basis for European 
integration offers political advantages over a free trade area (FTA). Whether a 
CU yields better economic results than a FTA is still the basis for a lot of 
academic discussion. 
It can not be denied that a free trade area is easier to run than a customs 
union. Higher stages of economic integration – common market, economic union, 
monetary union – become at each stage even more difficult to manage. This 
explains why the political and bureaucratic apparatus of the EU shows 
disappointing levels of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and 
representation. This problem becomes worse each time when more states join the 
EU. The Constitution is offering the basis for a more transparent Europe. Its 
future implementation in 2009 is partly saved by the new downsized Reform 
Treaty.  
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U vrijeme pisanja ovog članka Europska Unija (EU) navršava pedeset godina 
svoga postojanja. Sa svojih 27 država članica, i sa Hrvatskom te ostalim 
zemljama koje će se također pridružiti u budućnosti EU je bez sumnje jedna od 
najuspješnijih ekonomskih integracijskih blokova u svijetu. Ipak, ekonomska 
integracija ili regionalizam je uvijek drugo najbolje rješenje u usporedbi sa 
multilateralnom trgovinskom liberalizacijom. U Rimskom ugovoru (1957), 
carinska unija je bila izabrana kao temeljna opcija za ekonomsku integraciju, za 
razliku od područja slobodne trgovine koju su na primjer prihvatile NAFTA i 
EFTA. Izbor da to bude carinska unija više je zbog političkih nego ekonomskih 
razloga. Od osnivanja carinske unije 1968, EU je s godinama postala zajedničko 
tržište, ekonomska zajednica i monetarna zajednica ograničena na zemlje koje su 
u međuvremenu prihvatile euro. EU kao tržišna ekonomija zahtijeva slobodnu 
interakciju proizvođača i potrošača. Ipak, unutar carinske unije postoji teorija 
koja se donekle temelji na predrasudi, a ide u prilog proizvođača. Ova tendencija 
potvrđena je od strane brojnih EU politika orijentiranih na proizvođače, a koje 
nisu dostatno kompenzirane blagom politikom zaštite potrošača. Učinak EU nije 
optimalan u područjima kao što su efikasnost, efektivnost,zastupljenost i 
odgovornost. Ustav nudi regulatorni okvir za bolji učinak EU. Na žalost Ustav je 
odbijen 2005. negativnim rezultatima referenduma u Francuskoj i Nizozemskoj. 
23. lipnja 2007. šefovi država EU odlučili su nastaviti rad sa skraćenom verzijom 
Ustava. Provedba ovakvog Reformskog Sporazuma očekuje se 2009. 
Ključne riječi: ekonomska integracija, carinska unija, proizvođači, potrošači, 
političari, Ustav, Reformski Sporazum        
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